Abstract-We design the first fully-distributed algorithm for generalized Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games on a time-varying communication network, under partial-decision information, i.e., the agents have no direct access to the aggregate decision. The algorithm is derived by integrating dynamic tracking into a projected pseudo-gradient algorithm. The convergence analysis relies on the framework of monotone operator splitting and the Krasnosel'skii-Mann fixed-point iteration with errors.
I. INTRODUCTION
A N aggregative game is a collection of inter-dependent optimization problems associated with noncooperative decision makers, or agents, where each agent is affected by some aggregate effect of all the agents [1] . Remarkably, aggregative games arise in several applications, such as demand side management in the smart grid [2] , e.g. for charging/discharging electric vehicles [3] , demand-response regulation in competitive markets [4] , congestion control in traffic and communication networks [5] . The common denominator is the presence of a large number of selfish agents, whose aggregate actions may disrupt the shared infrastructure, e.g. the power grid or the transportation network, if left uncontrolled.
Designing solution methods for multi-agent equilibrium problems in noncooperative games has recently gained high research interest. Several authors have developed semidecentralized and distributed equilibrium seeking algorithms for games without coupling constraints [6] , and for games with coupling constraints [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] .
With focus on the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problem, the formulations in [9] , [10] have introduced an elegant approach based on monotone operator theory [11] to characterize the equilibrium solutions as the zeros of a monotone operator. Not only is the monotone-operatortheoretic approach general -e.g., unlike variational inequalities, smoothness of the cost functions is not required -but also computationally viable, since several algorithmic methods to solve monotone inclusions are already well established, e.g. operator-splitting methods [11, §26] .
However, in the aforementioned literature on noncooperative equilibrium computation, it is assumed that the agents Organization of the paper: In Section II, we formalize the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem for aggregative games over a time-varying communication network. In Section III, we present a fully-distributed algorithm and discuss its interpretation from an operator theoretic and fixed-point perspective. In Section IV, we establish global convergence of the proposed method. To corroborate the theory, in Section V, we study the performance of the proposed method on a Nash-Cournot game. Concluding remarks and future research directions are discussed in Section VI.
Basic notation: R denotes the set of real numbers, and R := R∪{∞} the set of extended real numbers. 0 (1) denotes a matrix/vector with all elements equal to 0 (1); to improve clarity, we may add the dimension of these matrices/vectors as subscript. A ⊗ B denotes the Kronecker product between the matrices A and B. For a square matrix A ∈ R n×n , its transpose is A ⊤ ; A ≻ 0 ( 0) stands for positive definite (semidefinite) matrix. Given A ≻ 0, · A denotes the Ainduced norm, such that Operator theoretic definitions: Id(·) denotes the identity operator. The mapping ι S : R n → {0, ∞} denotes the indicator function for the set S ⊆ R n , i.e., ι S (x) = 0 if x ∈ S, ∞ otherwise. For a closed set S ⊆ R n , the mapping proj S : R n → S denotes the projection onto S, i.e., proj S (x) = argmin y∈S y − x . The set-valued mapping N S : R n ⇒ R n denotes the normal cone operator for the set S ⊆ R n , i.e., N S (x) = ∅ if x / ∈ S, v ∈ R n | sup z∈S v ⊤ (z − x) ≤ 0 otherwise. For a function ψ : R n → R, dom(ψ) := {x ∈ R n | ψ(x) < ∞}; ∂ψ : dom(ψ) ⇒ R n denotes its subdifferential set-valued mapping, defined as ∂ψ(x) := {v ∈ R n | ψ(z) ≥ ψ(x) + v ⊤ (z − x) for all z ∈ dom(ψ)}. A set-valued mapping F : R n ⇒ R n is (strictly) monotone if (u − v)
⊤ (x − y) ≥ (>) 0 for all x = y ∈ R n , u ∈ F (x), v ∈ F (y); F is restricted (strictly) monotone on Y ⊂ R n if (z * − z) ⊤ (x * − x) ≥ (>)0 for all ∀x * ∈ Y , x ∈ R n \ Y , z * ∈ F (x * ), x ∈ F (x); F is η−strongly monotone, with η > 0, if (u − v)
⊤ (x − y) ≥ η x − y 2 for all x = y ∈ R n , u ∈ F (x), v ∈ F (y); fix (F ) := {x ∈ R n | x ∈ F (x)} and zer (F ) := {x ∈ R n | 0 ∈ F (x)} denote the set of fixed points and of zeros, respectively. A single-valued mapping F : R n → R n is L-Lipschitz continuous, with L > 0, if F (x) − F (y) ≤ L x − y for all x, y ∈ R n ; F is nonexpansive if it is 1-Lipschitz continuous; F is η-averaged, with η ∈ (0, 1), if F (x) − F (y)
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT Consider a set of N agents indexed by I = {1, . . . , N }. The i-th agent is characterized by a local strategy set Ω i ⊂ R n and a cost function J i (x i ,x), which depends on the decision of agent i, x i , and on the aggregate of all agent decisions, i.e.,
Moreover, we assume that the collective strategy profile x := col(x 1 , . . . , x N ) ∈ R nN must satisfy a coupling constraint, described by the affine function x → Cx − c, where
, and C i , c i are local parameters known to agent i only. In summary, the aim of each agent i, given the decision variables of the other agents, i.e., x −i := col(x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . , x N ), is to choose a strategy x i that solves its local optimization problem, according to the game setup above, i.e., ∀i ∈ I :
where the last constraint is equivalent to Cx − c ≤ 0. Assumption 1: For all i ∈ I and any fixed u ∈
n is non-empty, compact and convex. The global feasible set
is non-empty and satisfies Slater's constraint qualification.
From a game-theoretic perspective, our goal is to distributively compute a generalized Nash equilibrium of the aggregative game described by the N inter-dependent optimization problems in (1) .
Definition 1 (Generalized Nash equilibrium): A collective strategy x * is a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) of the game in (1) if x * ∈ K and, for all i ∈ I and for all z such that (z,
A. Communication networks
We consider a time-varying network to model the communications among agents over time. At each stage k, the communication is described by an undirected graph G k = (I, E k ), where I is the set of vertices (agents) and E k ⊆ I × I is the set of edges. An unordered pair of vertices (i, j) belongs to E k if and only if agents j and i can exchange information. The set of neighbors of agent i at stage k is defined as N i (k) = {j| (i, j) ∈ E k }. Next, we assume the graphs sequence {G k } k∈N to be Q−connected.
Assumption 2:
There exists an integer Q ≥ 1 such that the graph (I, ∪ Q ℓ=1 E ℓ+k ) is connected, for all k ≥ 0. This assumption ensures that the intercommunication intervals are bounded for agents that communicate directly. In other words, every agent sends information to each of its neighboring agents at least once every Q time intervals.
We consider a mixing matrix W (k) = [w i,j (k)] associated with G k , whose elements satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 3 is strong but typical for multiagent coordination and optimization [18] . For an undirected graph it can be fulfilled, for example, by using Metropolis weights:
Finally, let us introduce the transition matrices Ψ(k, s) from time s to k: 
with Q as in Assumption 2 and ǫ as in Assumption 3.
B. GNE as zeros of a monotone operator
As first step, we characterize a GNE of the game in terms of the KKT conditions of the coupled optimization problems in (1). For each agent i ∈ I, let us introduce the Lagrangian function L i , defined as
is the dual variable of agent i associated with the coupling constraints, and ι Ωi is the indicator function. It follows from [20, §12.2.3 ] that the set of strategies x * is a GNE of the game in (1) if and only if the following coupled KKT conditions are satisfied for some λ 1 , . . . , λ N ∈ R m ≥0 :
The next proposition characterizes the subclass of variational generalized Nash equilibria (v-GNE) as the solution set of the KKT conditions in (5) with equal dual variables, i.e., λ * 1 = . . . = λ * N , or equivalently as the solution to a specific variational inequality 1 , or equivalently as the zero set of the set-valued mapping
where
is the normal cone operator associated with a set S and F is the so-called pseudo-gradient (PG) mapping defined as
To emphasize the structure of F , we define
and the extended PG mapping
where each component mapping F i is given by (8) . With this notation, we haveF (x, 1 ⊗x) = F (x). Next, we assume Lipschitz continuity of the mappingF in (9) 
there exists some LF > 0 such that, for all x, y ∈ Ω and v, w ∈Ω,
Proposition 1: Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, the following statements are equivalent: The following assumptions on the PG mapping are standard (e.g. [8, Th. 3] , [10, Assumption 2] , [24, Assumption 3] ) and sufficient to ensure the convergence of standard GNE seeking algorithms.
Assumption 5 (Cocoercive pseudogradient):
The mapping F in (7) is χ−cocoercive over Ω.
When F is ξ−strongly monotone and 
C. Boundedness of the dual variables
In this section, we formally establish the boundedness of the dual solution set of VI(F, K) or, equivalently, of the dual part of the monotone inclusion col(x * , λ * ) ∈ zer(U ). In the remainder of the paper, we assume that each agent can estimate a superset of
We have that D is bounded and D * ⊆ D. Furthermore, it follows that the set of zeros of the operator U in (6) corresponds to the set of zeros of the following operator with bounded domain:
.
Remark 2:
In the context of constrained distributed optimization, an estimate of the optimal dual solution set can be construct based on a Slater's vector, see [26, §4.2] , [27, §3.A (2)]. The extension of these estimation methods to generalized noncooperative games would rely on Lagrangian duality theory for variational inequalities [23] . In practice, the agents do not need an accurate estimate of the optimal dual solution set D * and can simply construct a local superset D by taking the upper bound B D large enough.
D. A standard semi-decentralized algorithm
It follows by Proposition 1 that the original GNE seeking problem corresponds to the following monotone inclusion problem:
Next, we recall a standard semi-decentralized GNE seeking algorithm obtained by solving the monotone inclusion problem in (10) by means of a preconditioned forward-backward (pFB) splitting [24, Alg. 1].
ALGORITHM 1 Semi-decentralized v-GNE seeking
In parallel, for all i ∈ I :
Central coordinator:
If the step sizes {α i } i∈I and β are chosen small enough, then the sequence (col(x k , λ k )) k∈N generated by Algorithm 1 converges to some col(x * , λ * ) ∈ zer(U ), where x * is a v-GNE, see [24, Th. 1] for a formal proof of convergence.
Remark 3: Algorithm 1 is not distributed. In fact, at each iteration k, a central coordinator is needed to:
(i) gather and broadcast the average strategyx k ;
(ii) update and broadcast the dual variable λ k .
III. A DISTRIBUTED GNE SEEKING ALGORITHM

A. Towards a fully distributed algorithm
A first step towards a fully-distributed algorithm consists of endowing each agent with a copy, λ i , of the dual variable and enforcing consensus on the local copies. Consider the setvalued mapping T , obtained by augmenting U D with the local copies of the dual variable:
⊤ represents the projection onto the disagreement space.
Remark 4:
When the local copies of the dual variable are equal, i.e., λ ∈ D := {1 N ⊗ λ, | λ ∈ D}, the first row block of T corresponds to that of U D , while each of the N components of the second row block of T describes the same slack complementarity condition, namely, the second row block of U D .
We note that the mapping T in (11) can be written as the sum of two operators, i.e.,
where S is a skew-symmetric linear mapping defined as
The formulation T = T 1 + T 2 is called splitting of T , and will be exploited in different ways later on. The next lemma shows that T 2 is maximally monotone and that T 1 is cocoercive and strictly monotone with respect to the consensus subspace of the dual variables, i.e., Ω × D .
Lemma 3: Let Assumptions 1, 5 hold true. The following statements hold:
Proof: See Appendix A. The next proposition exploits the restricted strict monotonicity of T to shows that the v-GNE of the original game are fully characterized by the zeros of T .
Proposition 2: Let Assumption 1 hold true. The following statements hold:
To find a zero of T , we exploit a preconditioned version of the forward-backward method [11, §25.6] on the splitting (12)- (13), similarly to [10] , [24] , thus obtaining Algorithm 2.
For all i ∈ I :
Local projected pseudo-gradient update :
Local Krasnosel'skii-Mann process:
Remark 5: The local auxiliary variables d i 's are introduced to cast Algorithm 2 in a more compact form.
The next theorem establishes global convergence of Algorithm 2 to a v-GNE if the step-sizes are chosen according to the following choices.
Assumption 6: Take 0 < δ ≤ min{1, χ}, where χ as in Assumption 5. Set the global parameter τ > 1 2δ and denote ν := 2δτ 4δτ −1 ∈ (1/2, 1). Set the step-sizes as follows:
Note that the design choice γ k = 1, for all k ∈ N, always satisfies Assumption 6 (iii).
Theorem 1: Let Assumptions 1, 5 hold. If the step-sizes {α i , β i } i∈I and (γ k ) k∈N are set as in Assumption 6, then the sequence (col(x k , λ k )) k∈N generated by Algorithm 2 converges to some col(x * , λ * ) ∈ zer(T ), where x * is a v-GNE of the game in (1) .
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark 6 (Algorithm 2 as a fixed-point iteration):
Our convergence analysis is based on recasting the dynamics generated by Algorithm 2 as the fixed-point iteration
is the stacked vector of the iterates and R is the so-called pFB operator, defined as
where T 1 , T 2 in (12)-(13) characterize the splitting of T , and Φ is the so-called preconditioning matrix, here chosen as
Then, we show that, if the step sizes in the main diagonal of Φ are set according to Assumption 6, the mapping R is averaged with respect to the Φ-induced norm, i.e., · Φ . Hence, the fixed-point iteration (15) converges to some ω
, where x * is a v-GNE, see Appendix C for a complete convergence analysis.
To conclude this section, we note that the projected-pseudogradient updates in Algorithm 2 can be cast compactly as
We note that Algorithm 2 is not distributed, since the local updating rule of each agent requires the knowledge of (i) the average strategy, i.e.,
, which characterizes the violation of the coupling constraints, i.e.,
B. A fully-distributed algorithm via dynamic tracking
To implement Algorithm 2 fully-distributively over a timevarying network, we approximate its updates by endowing each agent i with some surrogate variables (or estimates), i.e., σ i , y i and z i , that dynamically track the true aggregatesx k , d
k andλ k , respectively. Then, to mitigate the errors due to the inexactness of the surrogate variables, we relax the projectedpseudo-gradient iterations by means of a Krasnosel'skii-Mann (KM) process [11, eq.(5.12)], whose step-sizes are set according to the following design choice.
Assumption 7:
The sequence (γ k ) k∈N satisfies the following conditions:
For example, Assumption 7 is satisfied for step sizes of the form γ k = (k + 1) −b where
The proposed algorithm relies on agents constructing an estimate of the aggregates by mixing information drawn from local neighbors and making a subsequent relaxed projectedpseudo-gradient step, as in Algorithm 2. To build the estimates 
Then, on the basis ofσ 
Communication and distributed averaging:
Local strategy update and dynamic tracking ofd k :
Note that the projected-pseudo-gradient updates in Algorithm 3 can be recast in a compact form as
wherê
IV. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS To prove the convergence of Algorithm 3, we rely on the framework of the inexact Krasnosel'skii-Mann fixed-point iteration [17, Alg. 5.4] . Informally speaking, our goal is to show that the error deriving from the inexactness of the estimates σ i 's, y i 's and z i 's goes to zero asymptotically, in which case, also (x k ) k∈N generated by Algorithm 3 globally converges to a v-GNE. Technically, we aim at exploiting [17, Th. 5.5], which establishes convergence of an inexact version of the KM iteration in (15), i.e.,
when R is nonexpansive and the step-size and error sequences, (γ k ) k∈N and (e k ) k∈N , respectively, satisfy
Note that Algorithm 3 corresponds to the KM with errors in (22) where ω k = col(x k , λ k ) and the error at stage k is 
A. Analysis of the relaxed error sequence
In
Proof: See Appendix D. The next lemma provides upper bounds for the estimation errors at each stage k of Algorithm 3.
Lemma 5: Let Assumptions 1-3 hold true. Then, there exist some positive constants B Ω , B D , B Y , δ 1 and δ 2 and a vanishing scalar sequence (φ k ) k∈N defined as
with ρ as in (4) and (γ k ) k∈N as in Assumption 7, such that the following upper bounds hold for all k ∈ N:
Proof: See Appendix E. By exploiting the upper bounds in Lemma 5 and a result on the convergence of scalar sequences, which is recalled next, we can show that the estimates asymptotically converge to their correspondent aggregate true values.
Lemma 6 ([28, Lemma 3.1]):
Proposition 3: Let Assumptions 1-3 hold true. Then, the following statements hold:
Proof
where lim k→∞ ρ k = 0, since 0 < ρ < 1 by Lemma 1, and lim k→∞ k s=1 ρ k−s γ s−1 = 0 by Lemma 6 (a), since 0 < ρ < 1 and lim k→∞ γ k = 0 by Assumption 7. Hence, lim k→∞ σ k − 1 ⊗x k = 0. The proofs of (ii) and (iii) are analogous.
Next, we derive an upper bound for the error e k in (23) that directly depends on the estimation errors in Lemma 5.
Lemma 7:
Let Assumptions 1-3 hold true. Then, the following bound holds for all k ∈ N:
Proof: See Appendix F. Finally, by combining the upper bounds in Lemma 5 and 7 and exploiting a result on the convergence of scalar sequences, i.e., Lemma 6 (b), we show that condition (C.2) holds, namely, the relaxed error sequence (γ k e k ) k∈N is summable.
Lemma 8:
Let Assumptions 1-3 hold true. The sequence (γ k e k ) k∈N , with e k as in (23), is summable, i.e.,
Proof: See Appendix G. Now, we can prove the convergence of Algorithm 3.
Theorem 2: Let Assumptions 1-5 hold true, the step sizes {α i , β i } i∈I be set as in Assumption 6, and (γ k ) k∈N as in Assumption 7. Then, the sequence (col(x k , λ k )) k∈N generated by Algorithm 3 globally converges to some col(x * , λ * ) ∈ zer(T ), where x * is a v-GNE of the game in (1).
Proof: For all k ∈ N, the iterations of Algorithm 3 can be cast as the Krasnosel'skii-Mann process with errors (16) and e k as in (23) . By [17, Th. 5.5], the sequence (ω k ) k∈N converges to some ω * ∈ fix(R), since R is averaged, thus nonexpansive, by Lemma 11, and (C.1)−(C.2) hold, by Assumption 7 and Lemma 8, respectively. To conclude, we note that ω * ∈ fix(R) = zer(Φ −1 T 1 + Φ −1 T 2 ), by [11, Prop. 25.1 (iv)], and that zer(Φ −1 T 1 + Φ −1 T 2 ) = zer(T ) = ∅, with T as in (11) , since Φ ≻ 0, by Lemma 9, and T 1 + T 2 = T . Since ω * ∈ zer(T ), then x * is a v-GNE of the game in (1), by Proposition 2 (ii).
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we study the performance of the proposed algorithm on a class of network Nash-Cournot games with market capacity constraints. Such games represent an instance of generalized aggregative Nash games. In Section V-A, we describe the player cost functions and strategy sets and verify that the necessary assumptions are satisfied. In Section V-B, we compare the performance of our algorithm against a standard semi-decentralized method (Algorithm 1).
A. Generalized network Nash-Cournot game
We extend the network Nash-Cournot game model proposed in [14, §IV] with additional market capacity constraints. Specifically, consider N firms that compete over m markets. Let firm i's production and sales at location l be denoted by g i,l and s i,l , respectively, while its cost of production at location l is denoted by f i,l (g i,l ) and defined as follows:
where a i,l and b i,l are scaling parameters for agent i. The goods sold by firm i at location l fetch a revenue p(s l )s i,l , where p(s l ) denote the sales price at location l and s l = N i=1 s i,l represents the aggregate sales at location l. The market price is set according to an inverse demand function which depends on the aggregate of the network, i.e.,
where d l is the overall demand for location l. Each firm i has a production limitation at location l, described by u i,l . Moreover, the overall production in each market l must meet the correspondent demand d l and do not exceed a maximum capacity r l . Hence, the coupling constraints d l ≤ N i=1 g i,l ≤ r l , for all l = 1, 2, . . . , m, have to be satisfied.
Overall, each firm i, given the strategies of the other firms, aims at solving the following optimization problem:
Effectively, the payoff function of firm i is parametrized by nodal aggregate sales and its constraints depend on the other firms' strategies, thus leading to a generalized aggregative game. In this example, we assume that the firms communicate over a dynamic network to cope with the lack of aggregate information, which is necessary to compute their optimal production and sale strategies.
Next, we show that the proposed network NashCournot game does satisfy our technical setup. Let x i = col(g i,1 , . . . , g i,n , s i,1 , . . . , s i,n ) ∈ R 2m denote the strategy vector of agent i and x = col(x 1 , . . . , x N ) denote the collective strategy profile. The cost function of agent i is quadratic, convex in x i , continuously differentiable and can be cast in a compact form as
The local feasible set of firm i is non-empty (for an adequate choice of u i,l 's ), convex, compact and reads as
The coupling constraints are affine and can be written in compact form as in (1) The pseudo gradient mapping F is affine and reads as
with
A = blkdiag(A 1 , . . . , A N ) and b = col(b i , . . . , b N ). By a direct inspection of the eigenvalues of P , we can show that F is strongly monotone and Lipschitz continuous, when the coefficients a i,j 's are positive. Hence, Assumption 5 is satisfied.
In particular, it follows by [25, p.79 ] that F is χ−cocoercive with χ := P −1 . Moreover, since F is strongly monotone and the sets Ω i are compact, it follows by Remark 1 that there exists a unique v-GNE. The mappingF is affine and reads as
Similarly, it can be shown thatF is LF −Lipschitz continuous with LF := max ij {a i,j , 1}. Thus, Assumption 4 is satisfied.
B. Simulations studies
In our numerical study we consider a network Nash-Cournot game played by 20 firms, i.e., N = 20, over 10 markets, i.e., m = 10. All the parameters of the game are drawn from uniform distributions and fixed over the course of the entire simulations. Specifically, for all i ∈ I and l ∈ {1, . . . , m}, we set the parameters of production cost in (25) as a i,l ∈ U(2, 3) and b i,l ∈ U(2, 12), where U(t, τ ) denotes the uniform distribution over an interval [t, τ ] with t < τ . We set the production capacities of firm i as u i,l ∈ U(50, 100) for all l ∈ {1, . . . , n } and for all i ∈ I. Moreover, the demand at market l is set as d l ∈ U(90, 100), while the market capacity as r l ∈ U(d l , 2d l ) for all l ∈ {1, . . . , m }.
At each iteration k, the firms communicate according to a randomly generated and connected small world, where each node has 4 neighbors. To create a doubly stochastic mixing matrix W (k), we exploit the Metropolis weighting rules in (2). Thus, Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied. The agents update their decisions and their estimates as in Algorihtm 3. The stepsizes {α i , β i } i∈I are set according to Assumption 6, where the global parameter τ is set 5% larger than the theoretical lower bound 1 2δ , where δ = min{1, P } and P as in (28) . In Figure 1 , we show the trajectories of the sequences of normalized residuals x k − x * / x 0 − x * for different choices of the step-size sequence (γ k ) k∈N . Moreover, we compare the trajectories of Algorithm 3 with those obtained with Algorithm 1 [24, Alg. 1], which is a semi-decentralized algorithm and works under the assumption of full-decision information, i.e., the firms have access to the real aggregate information at each stage k of the algorithm. As expected, the semi-decentralized algorithm converges faster than the fullydistributed counterpart. Interestingly, we notice that convergence is achieved also in the case of fixed relaxation step in the KM process, e.g. γ k = 1 for all k ≥ 0, which is not supported by our theoretical analysis.
In Figure 2 , we compare the trajectories of the consensus disagreement of the dual variables (Ł ⊗ I m )λ k , for two choices of the step-size sequence (γ k ) k∈N .
VI. CONCLUSION
For a general class of aggregative games with linear coupling constraints over time-varying communication networks, we have designed the first single-layer, fully-distributed algorithm to compute a variational generalized Nash equilibrium. Global convergence can be established via monotone-operatortheoretic and fixed-point arguments, integrated with a dynamic tracking methodology.
The analysis approach in this paper is genuinely novel, hence opens up a number of new research directions. Motivated by the numerical results of Section V, it would be valuable to explore the computational aspects of the proposed method, e.g. how the connectivity of the communication networks influences the convergence speed. Whether or not the proposed algorithm converges with fixed step sizes in the Krasnosel'skii-Mann process is currently an open question. Finally, it would be highly valuable to relax the assumption of double-stochasticity of the mixing matrices. 
The following inequalities show that T 1 in (13) is restricted strictly monotone w.r.t. Θ : (n+m)N . Moreover, since T 1 is also restricted-strictly monotone with respect to Θ then T enjoys the same property.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
. Hence, zer(T ) = ∅. (ii) From the first part of the proof, we know that there exists ω * ∈ Θ such that ω * ∈ zer(T ). Now, we show that all the zeros of T lie in Θ . By contradiction, let ω ′ ∈ zer(T ) and assume
, which, by Proposition 1, holds if and only if x ′ is a v-GNE.
C. Proof of Theorem 1
To prove convergence of Algorithm 2 we follow the same technical reasoning of the proof in [10, Alg. 1]. Specifically, the proof is divided in two parts to show that: (1) Algorithm 2 corresponds to the fixed-point iteration in (15) , i.e.,
is the so-called pFB operator.
(2) If the step sizes are set as in Assumption 6, then R is an averaged operator. Hence, (15) globally converges to some ω * := col(x * λ * ) ∈ fix(R). Since fix(R) = zer(T ),
with T as in (11), then x * is a v-GNE, by Proposition 2.
(1): Let us recast Algorithm 2 in a compact form as
Since
where we used α
which leads to
, then the inclusions in (33)−(34) can be cast in compact form as
where T 1 , T 2 and Φ as in (12), (13) and (17), respectively. By makingω k explicit in (35), we obtaiñ
which corresponds toω k = R(ω k ), where R is the pFB operator in (16) . Finally, it follows by (31)−(32) that
, which concludes the proof.
(2): Next, we introduce some technical statements that we exploit later on in this proof.
Lemma 9: Let the step-sizes {α i , β i } i∈I satisfy Assumption 6. Then the following statements hold:
Proof: (i): By the generalized Gershgorin circular theorem [29, Th. 2] , each eigenvalue µ of the matrix Φ in (17) satisfies at least one of the following inequalities:
Hence, if we set the step-sizes α i , β i as in Assumption 6, the inequalities (37)-(38) yield to µ ≥ τ . It follows that the smallest eigenvalue of Φ, i.e., µ min (Φ), satisfies µ min (Φ) ≥ τ > 0. Thus, Φ − τ I is positive semi-definite.
(ii): Let µ max (Φ) be the largest eigenvalue of Φ. We have
Lemma 10: Let Assumptions 1 and 5 hold and the stepsizes {α i , β i } i∈I satisfy Assumption 6. The following properties hold in the Φ-induced norm (i.e., · Φ ):
Proof: (i): Since T 1 is single-valued and Φ −1 nonsingular, by Lemma 9 (i), for each ω, ω
where the last inequality follows by Lemma 9 (ii). By (39) and the δ−cocoercivity of T 1 (Lemma 3 (ii)) Lemma 11: Let Assumptions 1, 5 hold and the step-sizes {α i , β i } i∈I satisfy Assumption 6. Then, the pFB operator , by Assumption 6. The fixed-point iteration (15) , that corresponds to Algorithm 2 by the first part of this proof, is the Krasnosel'skii-Mann iteration on the mapping R, which is ν−averaged, with ν ∈ ( 1 2 , 1), by Lemma 11. The convergence of (15) to some ω * := col(x * , λ * ) ∈ fix(R) follows by [11, Prop. 5.15] . To conclude, we note that ω * ∈ fix(R) = zer(Φ −1 T 1 + Φ −1 T 2 ), by [11, Prop. 25.1 (iv) ], and that zer(Φ −1 T 1 +Φ −1 T 2 ) = zer(T ), with T as in (11) , since Φ ≻ 0, by Lemma 9 (i), and T 1 + T 2 = T . Since the limit point ω * ∈ zer(T ) = ∅, by Proposition 2 (i), then x * is a v-GNE of the game in (1), by Proposition 2 (ii), thus concluding the proof.
D. Proof of Lemma 4
We prove equation (i) , for all i ∈ I. At step k, we assume thatσ k =x k . To conclude the proof, we show that relation (i) holds at step k + 1:
The first equality follows from the updating rule of the σ i 's in Algorithm 3, the second follows by definition ofx
k , the third follows since the mixing matrix W (k) is column stochastic, i.e., 1 ⊤ W (k) = 1 ⊤ , by Assumption 3, while the last equality follows from the induction step k, i.e., σ k =x k . The proof of equations (ii) and (iii) are analogous.
E. Proof of Lemma 5
For easy of notation, this proof is developed for the scalar case, i.e., n = m = 1. In this case, we can write
The update of the estimates σ i 's in Algorithm 3 can be written in a compact form as
By telescoping (41), we obtain
Now, considerσ k , which may be written as follows:
By Lemma 4, we have thatσ s =x s ∀s ≥ 0, which leads tō
From equations (42) and (43), we have the following:
The last inequality follows since Ψ(k, s)
for all k ≥ s ≥ 0, by Lemma 1. Next, we find an upper bound for x s − x s−1 . The update of the decisions x i 's can be written in a compact form as
is a convex combination of elements of the convex set Ω i . Since all the sets Ω i are compact, by Assumption 1, it follows that for some constant B Ω , we have
By combining (45) and (44), we obtain
where we exploited the initialization step
The update of the estimates z i 's in Algorithm 3 can be written in a compact form as
By telescoping (46), we obtain
Now, we estimate λ s − λ s−1 . The update of the decisions λ i 's can be written in a compact form as
is a convex combination of elements of the convex set D. Since D is compact, it follows that for some constant B D , we have
The update of the estimates y i 's in Algorithm 3 can be written in a compact form as
By telescoping (48), we obtain
Now, considerȳ k , which may be written as follows:
By Lemma 4, we have thatȳ
From the relations (49) and (50), we have the following:
where the last inequality follows since 
where the second inequality follows from (45). Consider the term x s −x s−1 . By exploiting the compact update (20) and the nonexpansiveness of the projection operator, we have 
where the second inequality follows from the Lipschitz continuity ofF , while the last inequality follows from the relation [ 
with (φ k ) k∈N as in (24) . The second inequality follows since γ s−1 ≤ γ s−2 , by Assumption 3. Finally, by combining (57) and (51), we obtain the upper bound in Lemma 5 (iii).
F. Proof of Lemma 7
From 
Consider x k −x k A2 , wherex k andx k A2 are defined in (20) and (18), respectively. By exploiting the nonexpansiveness of the projection, we can write
where the second inequality follows by the triangular inequality and the Lipschitz continuity ofF (Assumption 4). Now, consider λ k −λ k A2 , whereλ k andλ k A2 are defined in (21) and (19) , respectively. By exploiting the nonexpansiveness of the projection, we have
Finally, by combining (60) and (59) with (58) we obtain the upper bound in Lemma 7.
G. Proof of Lemma 8
By substituting the bounds on the estimation errors of Lemma 5 into the error bound in Lemma 7, we obtain 
where a 1 , a 2 , a 3 and a 4 are positive constants defined as a 1 := θB Ω ( α d LF + β d ) + θB D ( ᾱ C d + β ), a 2 := θB Ω ᾱ LF + θB D ( ᾱ C d + β ), a 3 := β C d and a 4 := β . Now, we show that each term on the righthand side of (61) is summable, hence also the sequence (γ k e k ) k∈N is such, i.e., It follows by Lemma 6 (b) that
for all k (Assumption 7) and 0 < ρ < 1.
